Dworkin's effort to distinguish multiple layers of "intention" that are embedded in the constitutional text has been taken as a substantial critique of traditional originalist jurisprudence. Dworkin has strongly argued that the constitutional text embodies abstract principles. These principles are understood to be both fundamental to the Founders' intentions and the primary focus of correct constitutional interpretation faithful to those intentions. This article argues that Dworkin's reconceptualization of originalism is theoretically flawed.Although there may be normative reasons for preferring that the judiciary always enforce broad constitutional principles, such a jurisprudence cannot be understood as either consistent with or required by an originalist interpretative method whose primary commitment is to fidelity to founding intent.
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the consistency between his own interpretive outcomes and original intent. History may not be dispositive for Dworkin, but it is a hard constraint on interpretive outcomes and an "anchor" by which interpretive results must be grounded.'1 Many have criticized Dworkin for not engaging in the historical research that would demonstrate that his interpretations are still linked to that anchor.12 Although this criticism is a serious one, Dworkin has neatly sidestepped it. A particularly interesting implication of his theory is that detailed historical research is not necessary to establish founding intent. If he is right about the appropriate theoretical structure of originalism, founding intent can be gathered through abstract theorizing rather than through historical research. His assertions about founding intent are more properly read as theoretical claims than as empirical ones.'3 My concern is whether originalism must really be Dworkin's "originalism."l4 11. Dworkin, Freedom's Law, pp. 9-14; Dworkin, "Arduous Virtue," pp. 1252-56. Similarly, Dworkin has argued that "it is as illegitimate to substitute a concrete, detailed provision for the abstract language of equal protection clause as it would be to substitute some abstract principle of privacy for the concrete terms of the Third Amendment" (Freedom's Law, p. 14). Michael McConnell has called these the 12. E.g., Perry, Constitution, The Courts, and Human Rights, pp. 70-72; Original Intent, Bassham, pp. 72-75.
13. Dworkin has occasionally backed his assertions with some historical evidence, for example by citing H. Jefferson Powell's work in support of his contention that "there is persuasive historical evidence that the framers intended that their own interpretations of the abstract language that they wrote should not be regarded as decisive in court" (Freedom's Law, p. 380nl). I do not address here the significance of these debates over the historical record.
14. Although there are many disagreements even among "traditional" originalists, I take originalism to refer to a theory of constitutional interpretation that requires judges to justify their decisions in terms of and should act to enforce the intentions of those who drafted and ratified the relevant constitutional text. Judges should rely on historical evidence in construing constitutional meaning, and complexities of interpreting the intent should be resolved internally to the historical evidence, with judicial restraint being the appropriate response to lingering textual ambiguities. I assume that originalists differ as to the exact scope of relevant historical evidence, how evidentiary conflicts are to be resolved, and even as to the status of precedent. Dworkin's suggestion that following original
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The article is divided into four parts. The first section briefly elaborates Dworkin's argument for expanding our notion of originalism and the three possible supports for Dworkin's distinctions. The goal is not to identify which argument is most central to Dworkin himself, but to cover the Dworkinite bases since all of these arguments are employed in the literature. The second section examines Dworkin's concept of "semantic intentions," which contends that the Founders chose abstract principles through the language that they employed. The third section examines a "moral realist" defense of Dworkin's argument. In this version of the argument, the Founders referred to specific moral concepts through the language that they employed. The fourth section considers Dworkin's normative argument, in which the Founders are understood as employing abstract concepts, which can in turn be accessed through the text. None of these arguments is compelling. Ultimately, the substantive content of the Founders' intentions must be determined empirically. The relative "breadth" of textual principles can only be determined through such an investigation, rather than through the type of a priori or moral argumentation that Dworkin offers. Dworkin's goals are better served by offering a substantive defense of the prioritization of the good over the intended, rather than attempting to stretch the notion of original intentions to include modern conceptions of the good.15 Dworkin The full range of Dworkin's thinking in this regard needs to be laid bare before trying to take aim at this moving target. Thus, rather than trying to discover the "real" Dworkin, this section will simply reconstruct the several versions of the categorization that Dworkin has offered over the years. These arguments share a common commitment to a basic distinction between abstract principles (concepts) and specific behavioral rules (conceptions). Dworkin's focus is on how judges flesh out "the skeleton of freedom and equality of concern" that the Constitution creates through "its great clauses, in their majestic abstraction."18 Such "majestic abstractions" as the cruel and unusual punishment or due process clauses require judges to address the problem of the level of generality at which textual requirements should be interpreted. Those who wish to emphasize the degree to which the Constitution only creates a "skeleton of freedom" understand the text as embodying certain abstract principles. The text does not tell us much beyond the fact that we must protect "freedom" or "equality of concern." Determining what principles such as freedom actually mean is the task of later interpreters. Others contend that the Constitution is actually composed of specific "conceptions" of freedom and equality. Later interpreters need not struggle with the definition of "freedom," for the text already contains lists of specific freedoms to be protected. From a purely textualist perspective, the difference between these abstract and concrete constitutional commitments is the difference between the EighthAmendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishment" and Article II's requirement that the president shall have "attained to the Age of thirty five Years." 16 
For Dworkin, good interpretation is concerned with elaborating these abstract constitutional principles. At least in the context of the textual clauses that are of the most concern to Dworkin, the Constitution represents the abstract intentions of the Founders, and those abstract intentions are more fundamental than any concrete intentions that they may have had.19 For Dworkin, "interpretation" is very much about determining what is already "in" the Constitution. A faithful interpreter cannot ignore the terms of the Constitution in order to import his own moral theory wholesale.20 But attention to the role of abstract intentions allows a judge to be faithful to the Constitution and the interpretive project, without being bound to the concrete intentions of particular authors with which he might disagree. The shift to abstract and concrete intentions, instead of concepts and conceptions, emphasizes the continuing centrality of intentions, or more broadly "purposes," to Dworkinian interpretation. Dworkin has argued that abstract intentions are just as much the intentions of the Founders as the concrete intentions emphasized by traditional originalists, and indeed the abstract concepts better capture their intentions than does "a concrete, dated reading." Thus, judges who engage in an "abstract, principled, moral reading" are not only "interpreting" the text, they are also interpreting original intentions embedded in the text.21 The question then becomes how we know that the Constitution contains abstract as well as concrete intentions, and that the former are to be interpretively preferred to the latter.
Dworkin offers essentially three reasons for thinking that abstract principles have been constitutionalized in the text. First, Dworkin has contended that the Founders necessarily intended to constitutionalize only the broad concept because they employed abstract textual language.22 This is essentially a textualist argument, which urges us to examine the text in the context of THE REVIEW OF POLITICS conventional rules of language.23 If the Founders used a phrase such as "cruel and unusual," then they must have intended the semantic possibilities contained in that broad phrase rather than any more specific list of punishments that they could have enumerated for prohibition. The priority of abstract intentions "seems obvious" to Dworkin, for "if those who enacted the broad clauses had meant to lay down particular conceptions, they would have found the sort of language conventionally used to do this."24 More recently, Dworkin has referred to this as the "semantic intention" of the Founders, to be contrasted with "what they intended-or expected or hoped-would be the consequence of their saying it."25 In this reading, there are two types of originalism: semantic originalism and expectations originalism. Only the former captures the meaning that actually inheres within the text. Semantic originalism contends that clauses should "be read to say what those who made them intended to say," whereas expectations originalism "holds that these clauses should be understood to have the consequences that those who made them expected them to have."26 As this shift in phrasing suggests, an emphasis on abstract principles is the only correct "originalist" approach, for only it interprets the Founders' intentions rather than their predictions about future legal applications.
A second argument suggests that concepts and conceptions should be prioritized not on the basis of the Founders' intentions, but rather on the basis of our own normative commitments. In developing the distinction between abstract and concrete intentions, Dworkin emphasized that the Founders necessarily had both, for their concrete conceptions derive from their abstract concepts. The Founders wished to ban certain concrete practices, such as flogging, because they understood them to be inconsistent with certain abstract principles, such as the rejection of cruel and unusual punishments. The Founders did not have to choose between those two intentions. It is not possible to identify either
as "my 'true' intentions or convictions or beliefs," for both "are genuine" and "any idea of my choosing between them is incoherent."27 As a consequence, in interpreting the Constitution, "the question for constitutional theory is not which statement is historically accurate but which statement to use in constructing a conception of constitutional intention." Constitutional interpretation ceases to be a historical enterprise at this point, since both abstract and concrete intentions can be found in the historical material; "judges must make substantive decisions of political morality" in order to settle the meaning of those concepts in the modern context.28 According to this argument, judges should favor the abstract over the concrete because the former is normatively to be preferred to the latter.
This shift from a historical-theoretical argument to a normative-theoretical argument leaves some uncertainty as to why abstractions are normatively preferred. Two possibilities emerge. Dworkin's arguments in favor of abstract over concrete intentions take two distinct paths. One emphasizes textual language, such that abstract phrases refer to abstract concepts. The other emphasizes normative commitments, such that abstract principles are to be preferred to concrete, and potentially flawed, applications. Dworkin has always held that both abstract and concrete commitments are available to a faithful interpreter of the constitutional text.35 He has intermittently added that both are available to a faithful originalist interpreter of the Constitution, and this is the position that he has favored most recently.36 Moreover, Dworkin contends, as a theoretical matter, abstract principles are more consistent with the Founders' intentions than are concrete conceptions. A "good" originalist will focus on the abstract principles embedded in the constitutional text, and this in turn will require an originalist interpreter to make substantive moral judgments and not simply empirical historical judgments.37 The remainder of this paper is concerned with demonstrating the flaws in this position.
The Problem with "Semantic Intentions"
In the 1990s, Dworkin has responded to originalist theories of constitutional interpretation by offering a Dworkinian reconstruction of originalism. In the end, Dworkin finds traditional originalists to be unfaithful to the constitutional text. 
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Constitutional fidelity, and to the Founders' intent, requires "fresh moral judgments" about the abstract principles contained in the text of the Constitution.38 A properly conceptualized "originalism" converges on a Dworkinian theory of law as integrity.
Dworkin's "originalism" is built on the identification of "semantic" or "linguistic" intentions, as distinguished from what he has variously labeled "expectation" or "political" intentions. 39 Dworkin is correct to note that the term intention can refer to several, quite distinct concepts. Furthermore, he is correct to argue that not all of these "intentions" are equally relevant form the perspective of constitutional interpretation. Unfortunately, distinguishing between semantic and expectation intentions is not sufficient to undermine traditional originalist assumptions about the proper approach to understanding constitutional meaning. Moreover, the distinction is not sufficient to establish that fidelity to the founding intent can be adequately secured through abstract moral reasoning without the necessity of detailed historical investigation, as Dworkin seems to assume. A properly conceptualized originalism should not necessarily rule out a role for contemporary moral theorizing in realizing the promise of the Constitution, but it still must insist on the priority of historical inquiry in faithful constitutional interpretation.
The appeal to semantic intentions is a form of textualism. In order to discover "what our Constitution means," Dworkin suggests that we must begin with the basics: "we have 
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To make the example work, however, Dworkin assumes too much about the boss's intention. Reasonable people can disagree over what constitutes the "best candidate available," as the boss was surely aware. On one dimension, say productivity, the son may well be the best available. On another dimension of qualifications for employment, however, say fit with the corporate culture, the son may be a bad choice. The boss and the manager do not disagree over the application of a single abstract standard of quality. They disagree over the relevant substantive standard to be applied. The boss may well appreciate learning that his son was not in fact the most productive candidate available, and thus that his expectation as to how the standard would be applied was mistaken.60 He would be unlikely to be interested in learning, however, that there were other, less productive candidates that would have produced a better cultural fit. The boss's intent was discoverable, and may have even been already known, by the manager. Failing to hire the boss's son would have been unfaithful not only to his expectations, but to his instructions. Of course, given the contested nature of these concepts, the boss might have been well advised to make explicit and concrete his particular understanding of "best," but his meaning was understandable regardless. The manager, in this example, may not have violated Dworkin's "identity constraint" as he defines it (she was, after all, acting on some principle of "best candidate" for employment), but she would no longer be adhering to his meaning. Moreover, the boss and the manager would not merely be "talking past another" in advancing their different understandings of the concept of "best. 
The Possibility of a Moral Referent
A second possible justification for Dworkin's confounding his emphasis on abstract principles with originalism focuses on language theory. This approach links moral theory with interpretation through the suggestion that, in employing broad textual language, the Founders referred to real moral concepts. Those real moral concepts must be explored theoretically in order to be explicated and ultimately applied in a judicial context. Unlike the argument considered above, this approach does not make any assumptions about the obvious or natural meaning of abstract phrases. No plain meanings are implicated by the use of moral language in this argument. Instead, moral language refers to moral principles, which are objectively discoverable and quite possibly not widely understood. The key to understanding constitutional language is not the "natural semantic meaning" of the words, but rather is the supposition that the Founders "intended to lay down an abstract principle forbidding whatever 216 INTENTIONS AND INTERPRETATION punishments are in fact cruel and unusual."62 The Founders did not leave an abstract text; they left a concrete text that specifically referred to difficult moral concepts.
In order to call into question the validity of this approach to interpreting constitutional intent, it is not necessary to challenge either the linguistic or the moral theories upon which it rests. It may well be true that moral concepts such as cruelty and equality have "real" content in the sense of an objectively discoverable substance. That one could discover what is "in fact" cruel punishment, however, does not necessarily imply that any given speaker intended to refer to that objective concept in any given utterance. Likewise, one need not generally deny the utility of a causal theory of language, in which language conveys meaning about the world by referring directly to external objects, in order to question its application in this situation. 
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THE REVIEW OF POLITICS theory, words "name" real objects. In employing a given term, I refer to the true essence of that real object.3 The descriptive theory, in contrast, relies on an individual's beliefs about the external world. In the descriptive theory, the reference is defined in relation to a cluster of descriptions. The words have no meaning outside the context of those descriptions.6 To use Saul Kripke's classic example, under the descriptive theory a "tiger" is defined in terms of a set list of descriptive characteristics, such as four legged and striped. The causal counter-example is of an as yet undiscovered "creature which, though having all the external appearance of tigers, differs from them internally enough that we should say that it is not the same kind of thing."65 The causal theory can distinguish between the real tiger and faux-tiger, since the real essences of tigers is built into the causal definition. By contrast, the descriptive theory, at least arguably, is left with linguistic uncertainty.66 As a consequence, an argument between Newtonian and Einsteinian physicists over the nature of "mass" can be understood as a real, empirical argument within the causal theory, whereas it may well appear to be an argument over mere semantics to the descriptivist theory. For the descriptivist, the two schools are merely talking about different things, but they happen to use the same word to refer to those different things. The two schools share only a common term. For the causal theorist, the two schools are talking about the same concept, even though they radically disagree over the nature of that concept and how it is to be described. The causal model, therefore, is said to better INTENTIONS AND INTERPRETATION accommodate the fact that the two schools share a common external reality and internal purpose.
This dispute in language theory takes on constitutional significance once moral concepts, as well as physical objects, are regarded as "real." Are political theorists disagreeing over the nature of "equality" in the same position as the physicists under the descriptivist model or the causal model? If the former, then equality is simply defined by local convention. If the latter, then equality is defined by objective reality. The interpreter's task in the first instance is to discover the appropriate convention, but in the second it is to discover what equality is "in fact." In the first case, "interpretation" becomes a political task of determining which side will control the definition. In the second case, interpretation becomes a philosophical task of discovering moral reality. Phrased in this fashion, the appeal of Dworkin's suggestion is obvious. A forum of principle is saved for constitutional interpretation. Accepting the alternative model puts the judge in the position of being an institutionally privileged chooser in a universe of subjective and competing preferences.67 The judge cannot be an agent of principle in that context; he can only be the one who decides. But Dworkin's stark dichotomy is misplaced. These are not our choices. We need not determine which theory is correct, or which vision of the judiciary is more appealing, for this is not an accurate representation of the constitutional text or of the interpretive task. Once again we have to distinguish between a purely semantic analysis of an abstract text and the interpretation of a specific, intentionally produced text, or utterance. The crucial issue at stake in constitutional interpretation is not how language behaves in general, but rather with what a particular clause means. Although a better understanding of the usual conventions of textual meaning may be helpful in construing a particular text, it cannot be decisive. The question of whether a term is meant to be used in a conventional sense is a specific one, and turns on the 67. The appeal of Dworkin's approach is further enhanced by the moral skepticism of originalists such as Robert Bork, who, in his constitutional theory, portrays politics as nothing but a battle of will, though in aligning judges on one side of that battle he denies that they make a political "choice." For Bork, the judge does not choose the winner, he merely enforces the will of the winner. E.g., Bork, Tempting of America, pp. 256-57. I I ? I 219 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS intentions of the speaker.6 In this account, the crucial determinant of whether Einsteinian and Newtonian physicists were engaged in a real or merely semantic dispute was the intention of the parties in the dispute, not the theory of language employed by the observer. The dispute was a real one because the parties involved intended to refer to the same concept, but disagreed on how that concept should be described. The problem for language theory is how to model that real dispute, not to determine whether the dispute is real. The intentions of the speaker are critical to determining the textual referent, regardless of the reality of the concepts to which the speaker refers or of the state of the speaker's knowledge. Suppose I yell, "look out for the tiger," as a creature crouches behind you. The meaning of that warning can be interpreted regardless of whether the crouching creature is a true tiger or has a different internal structure. Moreover, I may even know that the creature behind you is not a true tiger when I yell the warning, and yet the interpretation of the utterance would be unaffected by my use of the "wrong" word. I might be mistaken in my use of the language, but one could not say that what I actually "meant" was to take notice of the true tiger next time you visit the zoo. Semantic analysis can explain why I was in error in my use of language, but it cannot tell me how to interpret the text.69 Similarly, we often employ scientific language in casual ways without intending to invoke the technicalities of a professional discourse. We may refer to someone as obsessive or as dead, without necessarily intending to apply the appropriate psychological or medical standards associated with those terms in professional contexts. Undoubtedly for certain purposes, we would in fact want 
